Exposure-Resilient Cryptography (Survey)
Yevgeniy Dodis
New York University
Monday, September 8, 2:00PM
Lieb 3rd floor Conference Room
Computer Science Department
Stevens Institute of Technology
Abstract
Much successful research has focused on developing cryptographic
protocols and algorithms which are secure (in some appropriate and
well-defined sense) under the assumption that "secret" information is
kept hidden from the adversary. However, as cryptographic algorithms
are increasingly deployed on inexpensive, lightweight, mobile, and/or
unprotected devices, the risk of key exposure is becoming a
serious threat to the security of many real-world systems. Indeed, in
practice the attacks of this sort are, in many cases, more likely than
attacks which directly "crack" the cryptographic assumptions on which
the security of the scheme is based. And while at first glance it
might appear that not much can be done to prevent or mitigate the
damage caused by key exposure, the study of exposure-resilient
cryptography has led to a variety of diverse and effective
approaches for combating key exposure.
In this talk, I will survey several recent methodologies in the field
of exposure-resilient cryptography where I was involved.
These methodologies include
- remotely-keyed cryptography
- partial key exposure protection (incl. secret sharing)
- two-party schemes (i.e., client-server model)
- key evolution (including forward-secure, key-insulated and
intrusion-resilient cryptography)
- biometric authentication
- intentional key exposure protection (incl. traitor tracing).
The talk will be introductory.