8:30-9:15 Registration and breakfast
 

9:15 Opening remarks
 

9:30-10:30 Keynote talk: Cybersecurity and Its Limitations. Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota Digital Technology Center.

Abstract: Network security is terrible, and we are constantly threatened with the prospect of imminent doom. Yet such warnings have been common for the last two decades. In spite of that, the situation has not gotten any better. On the other hand, there have not been any great disasters either. To understand this paradox, we need to consider not just the technology, but also the economics, sociology, and psychology of security. Any technology that requires care from millions of people, most very unsophisticated in technical issues, will be limited in its effectiveness by what those people are willing and able to do. The interactions of human society and human nature suggest that security will continue being applied as an afterthought. We will have to put up with the equivalent of baling wire and chewing gum, and to live on the edge of intolerable frustration. However, that is not likely to block development and deployment of information technology, because of the non-technological protection mechanisms in our society.

10:30-11:00 Coffee break.
 

11:00-11:30 Privacy without Cryptography. Ari Juels, RSA Laboratories.

Abstract: The challenge in providing privacy and security for low-cost RFID tags is that they are computationally weak devices, unable to perform even basic symmetric-key cryptographic operations. Indeed, RFID tags of the present generation emit only a static identifier. This permits easy cloning of tags and also offers strong potential for various forms of privacy infringement, such as industrial espionage and invasive physical tracking of people or objects.

In this talk, we explore two approaches to providing privacy in low-cost RFID tags without standard cryptographic primitives. First, we discuss a simple technique involving rotation of pseudonyms with appropriate use of hardware delays. Second, we discuss the idea of selective "blocker" tags as a means of privacy enhancement. These are cheap, passive RFID tags that protect against the scanning of tags mapped to a specially designated "privacy zone." Blocker tags permit ordinary, unobstructed use of RFID tags by shops and consumers, at the same time that they offer protection to consumers against unwanted scanning of their belongings.

11:30-12:00 ISO Standardization of Public Key Encryption. Victor Shoup, New York University.

Abstract: In this talk, I will discuss principles used in the design and specification of public-key encryption schemes in an emerging ISO standard. One principle is a unified framework for building hybrid encryption schemes, and another is a unified framework for building ElGamal-like schemes.

12:00-2:00 Lunch.
 

2:00-3:00 Keynote Talk: Can we make legacy code type safe? Greg Morrisett, Harvard University.

Abstract: Our computing infrastructure is a huge pile of C and C++ code that is riddled with exploitable bugs including buffer overruns, integer overflows, memory leaks, race conditions and the like. Many of these problems could be avoided by re-coding in a type- safe language such as Java, but the cost of doing so is too high. This talk will survey some of the work that we and others have been doing to make legacy C code type safe, and focus on the technically difficult problems that remain.

3:00-3:30 Coffee break.
 

3:30-4:00 Context Binding: An Emerging Problem in Cryptographic Protocols. Catherine Meadows, Naval Research Laboratory.

Abstract: In mobile computing security-relevant information such as location, identity, and privileges must often change. Such context migration can often cause a security problem unless it is handled properly. In this talk we discuss three case studies of security failures resulting from context migration: one involving multihoming, another involving tunneled authentication protocols, and the third involving group key distribution. We discuss the threats to security involved and lessons learned, as well as the implications for the formal verification of cryptographic protocols.

4:00-4:30 After the buffer overflows are all patched: pre-deployment verification of behavioral contracts. David Naumann, Stevens Institute of Technology.

Abstract: Attacks currently found "in the wild" exploit buffer overflows and similar bugs and often gain complete control of a system, whereupon security measures can be disabled, reconfigured, or worse. Progress is being made towards finding and eliminating such bugs. In the future we can expect attacks that exploit more subtle bugs and trapdoors. This talk describes application-level vulnerabilities in component-based software and progress on countermeasures: code-based access control and static verification of formal behavioral contracts.

4:30 Concluding remarks.
 

Organizing Committee: Eduardo Bonelli, Tom Chothia, Adriana Compagnoni, Dominic Duggan, David Naumann, Susanne Wetzel, Rebecca Wright.
 

Sponsors: New Jersey Commission on Science and Technology, Stevens Technogenesis Fund, Imperatore School of Sciences and Arts, and the PORTIA project.