

Knowledge Representation

Non-Monotonic Logic

- Classical logic
 - Permanent conclusions based on complete information
- Nonmonotonic logic
 - Drawing conclusions based on **incomplete information**
You may need to retract them later!
 - (“Nonmonotonic” since learning new facts sometimes increases, sometimes *reduces* number of conclusions)

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Given: Turn key
Conclude: Car will start

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Given: Turn key
Conclude: Car will start

BUT Battery dead?

Then must retract conclusion.
Car doesn't start

Non-Monotonic Logic

- Nonmonotonic logic

Draw conclusions based on **incomplete information**

You may need to retract them later!

- Want inferences based on what happen in the default case (e.g., battery works)

Again, this relates to the problem in Semantic Nets/Description Logics of how to implement subclass inheritance of properties by default---while still allowing the defaults to be overridden.

How to capture non-monotonic reasoning?

Some approaches

- Default Logic

- New type of inference rule

Default
↓
Turn key : Car starts
Car starts

- Circumscription

- New semantics

$\mathcal{C}(P \Rightarrow Q)$ means
(Q *typically* follows from P)

- Autoepistemic Logic, Modal NM

- If **P** were true, I'd know **P**

$\neg \text{Know}(\mathbf{P}) \Rightarrow \neg \mathbf{P}$

- Negation as failure:

$(\text{Can't prove } \mathbf{P}) \Rightarrow \neg \mathbf{P}$

How to capture non-monotonic reasoning?

Some approaches

- I'll concentrate on the first two approaches, starting with **Circumscription**

Circumscription

- Given

- “Birds fly, normally.”
- “A Bulbul is a bird.”

$$\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Abnormal}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x)$$
$$\text{Bird}(B)$$

- Want to conclude, provisionally (by default)

- “Bulbuls fly”

$$\text{Fly}(B)$$

- **FOL can't conclude this**

(since we don't know whether Bulbuls are normal)

- **Circumscription:** Maximum Normality Assumption
Assume everything normal unless (until) you hear different

Circumscription

- Given
 - “Birds fly, normally.” $\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Abnormal}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x)$
 - “A Bulbul is a bird.” $\text{Bird}(B)$
- Want to conclude, provisionally (by default)
 - “Bulbuls fly” $\text{Fly}(B)$
- **FOL can't conclude this**

(since we don't know whether Bulbuls are normal)
- **Circumscription:** Maximum Normality Assumption
Assume as many things as possible are normal!

Circumscription

Assume something normal until you hear different (maximum normality)

- Given only:

- “Birds fly, normally.”
- “Bulbul is a bird.”

$$\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Abnormal}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x)$$
$$\text{Bird}(B)$$

- Consistent to assume **everything** normal!*

(No information to the contrary)

$$\forall x \neg \text{Abnormal}(x)$$

Max Normality Assumption + Standard FOL



“Bulbuls fly”

$\neg \text{Abnormal}(B)$, $\text{Bird}(B)$



$\text{Fly}(B)$

Circumscription

Assume normal until you hear different

- Given

- “Birds fly, normally.”

$\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Abnormal}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x)$

- “Bulbul is a bird.”

$\text{Bird}(B)$

- “Ostrich is a bird and Ostrich doesn’t fly”

$\text{Bird}(O) \wedge \neg \text{Fly}(O)$

So Ostrich is necessarily abnormal

(otherwise, it would fly)

- Consistent to assume Ostrich *only* abnormal thing:

$\forall x \text{ Abnormal}(x) \Rightarrow (x=O)$

(No information to the contrary)

Again, **Max Normality** + FOL



“Bulbuls fly”

Circumscription and the Frame Problem

- Circumscription

- Method for making inferences about *normal* situations
Don't need to rule out exceptions explicitly!

- “Normally, birds fly.” **NOT** “Birds fly, except Ostriches, Penguins, ...”

- Frame Problem

- Exploit Common Sense that things *normally* stay the same
Don't want to explicitly cite all possible changes!

- “Normally, guns stay loaded” **NOT** “Guns stay loaded, unless unloaded, fired, jam...”

→ **Circumscription a natural solution for Frame Problem?**

Circumscription and the Frame Problem

- Frame Problem

- Exploit Common Sense that things *normally* stay the same

Circumscription a natural solution for Frame Problem?

Maybe, but not it's not straightforward. Later I'll try applying circumscription to the Turkey shooting problem.

Generalizing Circumscription

- Recall **Maximum Normality** $\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Abnormal}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x)$
 - Assume **Abnormal(x)** true for as few things as possible, consistent with **Knowledge Base**.
- **Generalized Circumscription** for predicates **P**
*Assume **P** true for the smallest set possible, consistent with **Knowledge Base***

Examples

- **KB** = **Star**(Sun)

Circumscribe for predicate **Star**.

Then only the Sun is a **Star** \Leftrightarrow

$$\forall x \text{ Star}(x) \Leftrightarrow (x = \text{Sun})$$

Examples

- **KB** = **Star**(Sun)

Circumscribe for predicate **Star**.

Then only the Sun is a **Star** \Leftrightarrow

$$\forall x \text{ Star}(x) \Leftrightarrow (x = \text{Sun})$$

- **KB** = \neg **Fly**(Penguin)

Circumscribe for predicate **Fly**

Then *nothing* flies

$$\neg \exists x \text{ Fly}(x)$$

Examples

- Circumscribe for **fly**
 - **KB** = **Fly**(Wren) \wedge **Fly**(Robin)
 - Then only wrens + robins **fly** $\forall x \text{ Fly}(x) \Leftrightarrow (x=\text{Wren}) \vee (x=\text{Robin})$

Examples

- Circumscribe for **fly**
 - **KB** = **Fly**(Wren) \wedge **Fly**(Robin)
Then only wrens + robins **fly** $\forall x \text{ Fly}(x) \Leftrightarrow (x=\text{Wren}) \vee (x=\text{Robin})$
 - More complex case: **KB** = **Fly**(Wren) \vee **Fly**(Robin)

Either: only wrens **fly** $\forall x \text{ Fly}(x) \Leftrightarrow (x=\text{Wren})$
Or: only robins **fly** $\forall x \text{ Fly}(x) \Leftrightarrow (x=\text{Robin})$

Examples

- Circumscribe for **fly**
 - **KB** = **Fly**(Wren) \wedge **Fly**(Robin)
Then only wrens + robins **fly** $\forall x \text{ Fly}(x) \Leftrightarrow (x=\text{Wren}) \vee (x=\text{Robin})$
 - More complex case: **KB** = **Fly**(Wren) \vee **Fly**(Robin)
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Note: 2 Possible minimal definitions of Fly

Examples

- **KB** = $\text{RainAt}(\text{Hoboken}) \Rightarrow \text{RainAt}(\text{Stevens})$

Circumscribe for RainAt

Then it's not raining anywhere!

$$\forall x \neg \text{RainAt}(x)$$

Examples

- **KB** = $\text{RainAt}(\text{Hoboken}) \Rightarrow \text{RainAt}(\text{Stevens})$

Circumscribe for **RainAt**

Then it's not raining anywhere!

$$\forall x \neg \text{RainAt}(x)$$

- **KB** = $\text{Dog}(\text{Fido}) \wedge \forall x \text{Dog}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Dog}(\text{Child}(x))$

Circumscribe for **Dog**

Then only Fido and all descendants are Dogs

$\text{Dog}(\text{Fido}), \text{Dog}(\text{Child}(\text{Fido})), \text{Dog}(\text{Child}(\text{Child}(\text{Fido}))), \dots$

Circumscription: Problems

$\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Ab}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Flies}(x)$ (Normal birds fly)

$\text{Bird}(\text{Tweety})$ (Tweety and Chilly are birds)

$\text{Bird}(\text{Chilly})$

$\neg \text{Fly}(\text{Chilly})$

Can't conclude Tweety flies!

Only $(\text{Tweety} \neq \text{Chilly}) \Rightarrow \text{Flies}(\text{Tweety})$

Circumscription: Problems

$\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Ab}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Flies}(x)$ (Normal birds fly)

$\text{Bird}(\text{Tweety})$ (Tweety's a bird)

$\forall x \text{ Penguin}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Flies}(x)$ (Penguins are birds and don't fly)

Conclude Tweety flies

Circumscription: Problems

$\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Ab}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Flies}(x)$ (Normal birds fly)

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Conclude Tweety flies and no penguins!

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Conclude Tweety flies and no penguins!

Possible solution: **minimize Ab fixing #penguins**

(idea: try to make Tweety normal and fly without doing anything to affect how many penguins there are)

Circumscription: Problems

$\forall x \text{ Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Ab}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Flies}(x)$ (Normal birds fly)

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$\forall x \text{ Penguin}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Bird}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Flies}(x)$ (Penguins are birds and don't fly)

Minimize *Ab* fixing #penguins...

But now we can't conclude Tweety flies!

(If Tweety is penguin, we don't care about minimizing its abnormality...
so can only conclude $\neg \text{Penguin}(\text{Tweety}) \Rightarrow \text{Flies}(\text{Tweety})$)

Circumscription: Problems

- Typical Canadians don't speak French $\forall x \neg Ab(x) \wedge Can(x) \Rightarrow \neg Fr(x)$
- All Quebecois are Canadians $\forall x Q(x) \Rightarrow Can(x)$
- Quebecois typically speak French $\forall x \neg Ab(x) \wedge Q(x) \Rightarrow Fr(x)$
- Robert is from Quebec $Q(Robt)$

Does Robert speak French?

Circumscription: Problems

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Does Robert speak French?

We don't know.

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- Quebecois typically speak French $\forall x \neg Ab(x) \wedge Q(x) \Rightarrow Fr(x)$
- Robert is from Quebec $Q(Robt)$

Does Robert speak French? **We don't know.**

2 ways to minimize the abnormality

- Robert normal Canadian, abnormal Quebecois → no French
- Robert abnormal Canadian, normal Quebecois → French

Frame Problem

- Recall **Successor-State** Axioms solving Frame Problem

SS: (Fluent true after action) \Leftrightarrow (Action *made it* true, OR
Already true, Action didn't affect it)

- This assumes all change comes from Actions.

Circumscribing “Fluent changes after action” gives **SS axioms**

Yale Shooting Problem + Circumscription

Action Axioms

- **Circumscription:** normally, properties of the world *don't* change

$$\neg \text{ab}(\text{fluent}, \text{action}, S) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Holds}(\text{fluent}, S) \Leftrightarrow \text{Holds}(\text{fluent}, \text{Result}(\text{action}, S)))$$

- $\text{Holds}(\text{Loaded}, \text{Result}(\text{Load}, S))$ (Loading makes the Gun loaded)
- $\text{Holds}(\text{Loaded}, S) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Holds}(\text{Alive}, \text{Result}(\text{Fire}, S)) \wedge \neg \text{Holds}(\text{Loaded}, \text{Result}(\text{Fire}, S))$
(Firing loaded gun kills turkey and unloads gun)

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Action/Situation Sequence

$$S_1 = \text{Result}(\text{Load}, S_0)$$

$$S_2 = \text{Result}(\text{Sneeze}, S_1), \dots \quad S_{N+1} = \text{Result}(\text{Sneeze}, S_N),$$

$$S_{N+2} = \text{Result}(\text{Fire}, S_{N+1})$$

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Now we figure out what happens to turkey by minimizing the *abnormality*

Yale Shooting Problem + Circumscription

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Now we figure out what happens to turkey by minimizing the *abnormality*

- Common sense scenario in which turkey dies:

$$\text{Abnormality} = 1 \text{ (gun becomes loaded)} + 2 \text{ (turkey dies, gun unloads)} = 3 \text{ (total)}$$

Yale Shooting Problem + Circumscription

Action Axioms

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(Firing loaded gun kills turkey and unloads gun)

Now we figure out what happens to turkey by minimizing the *abnormality*

- Common sense scenario in which turkey dies:
 $\text{Abnormality} = 1$ (gun becomes loaded) + 2 (turkey dies, gun unloads) = 3 (total)
- Counterintuitive scenario: turkey survives
 $\text{Abnormality} = 1$ (gun becomes loaded) + 1 (gun unloads on sneeze, so it doesn't fire later) = 2 (total)

Yale Shooting Problem + Circumscription

Action Axioms

- **Circumscription:** normally, properties of the world *don't* change

$$\neg \text{ab}(\text{fluent}, \text{action}, S) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Holds}(\text{fluent}, S) \Leftrightarrow \text{Holds}(\text{fluent}, \text{Result}(\text{action}, S)))$$

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(Firing loaded gun kills turkey and unloads gun)

Now we figure out what happens to turkey by minimizing the *abnormality*

- Common sense scenario in which turkey dies:
Abnormality = 1 (gun becomes loaded) + 2 (turkey dies, gun unloads) = 3 (total)
- Counterintuitive scenario: **turkey survives because less abnormality!**
Abnormality = 1 (gun becomes loaded) + 1 (gun unloads on sneeze, so it doesn't fire later) = 2 (total)

Yale Shooting Problem + Circumscription

- Using circumscription to solve Frame Problem isn't easy
- Similar to Canadian Robert example: there's an unexpected way to minimize abnormality
- Historical note
 - Frame problem took 20 years to solve
 - Shooting Problem was turning point that showed problem's difficulty
- **Basic issue still open:** how to make our inference procedure accord with common sense on what happens by default?

Circumscription

- Circumscription really 2nd order logic...
but often it can be translated into FOL

So can use inference methods of FOL!
Resolution, Backward Chaining, ...

Default Logic

- Instead of restricting “**meaning**” of predicate as in Circumscription, *use new inference rules.*

- **Default Rule**

Given: **P**


and **Q** *consistent with all inferences from KB*,

Deduce: **R**

$$\frac{\mathbf{P} : \mathbf{Q}}{\mathbf{R}}$$

- **Example:** Does Tweety fly?

- $\mathbf{KB} = \{ \text{Bird}(\text{Tweety}), \quad \forall x \text{Penguin}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Bird}(x);$
 $\text{Bird}(x) : \text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x), \quad \text{Penguin}(x) : \neg\text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Fly}(x) \}$


Default inference rules

Default Logic

- Instead of restricting “**meaning**” of predicate as in Circumscription, *use new inference rules.*

- **Default Rule**

Given: **P**

and **Q** *consistent with all inferences from KB*,

Deduce: **R**

$$\frac{\mathbf{P} : \mathbf{Q}}{\mathbf{R}}$$

- **Example:** Does Tweety fly?

- $\mathbf{KB} = \{ \text{Bird}(\text{Tweety}), \quad \forall x \text{ Penguin}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Bird}(x);$
 $\text{Bird}(x) : \text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x), \quad \text{Penguin}(x) : \neg \text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Fly}(x) \}$
(If consistent, assume Birds fly) (If consistent, assume Penguins *don't* fly)

Default Logic

- **KB** = { Bird(Tweety), $\forall x$ Penguin(x) \Rightarrow Bird(x);
Bird(x) : Fly(x) \Rightarrow Fly(x), Penguin(x) : \neg Fly(x) \Rightarrow \neg Fly(x) }
- **Default Rule** Bird(T) : Fly(T) \Rightarrow Fly(T)

Given: Tweety is a bird,

Deduce: Tweety flies if this is consistent with *all conclusions from KB*.

- “***All conclusions from KB***” means a maximal set of conclusions:
you can't add any more.
 - ➔ So before we can decide whether Tweety flies, we must compute a maximal *consistent* set of conclusions.

Default Logic

- **KB** = { Bird(Tweety), $\forall x$ Penguin(x) \Rightarrow Bird(x);
Bird(x) : Fly(x) \Rightarrow Fly(x), Penguin(x) : \neg Fly(x) \Rightarrow \neg Fly(x) }

- A Maximal Set of Conclusions?

1. Bird(Tweety), $\forall x$ Penguin(x) \Rightarrow Bird(x)
2. Fly(Tweety),
3. $\forall x$ Penguin(x) \Rightarrow \neg Fly(x),
4. \neg Penguin(Tweety)

Tweety is Bird, Penguins are Birds

Applying first default rule (consistent so far)

Applying 2nd default rule (consistent so far)

2+3

Can't draw any more conclusions. These gives maximal consistent set

So yes! Tweety flies.

Default Logic

- $\text{KB} = \{ \text{Penguin}(\text{Tweety}), \forall x \text{Penguin}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Bird}(x);$
 $\text{Bird}(x) : \text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x), \text{Penguin}(x) : \neg\text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Fly}(x) \}$

Slightly different Knowledge Base: Tweety is a Penguin

Default Logic

- **KB** = { **Penguin**(Tweety), $\forall x \text{ Penguin}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Bird}(x)$;
 $\text{Bird}(x) : \text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Fly}(x)$, $\text{Penguin}(x) : \neg\text{Fly}(x) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Fly}(x)$ }

- A Maximal Set of Conclusions?

1. $\text{Penguin}(\text{Tweety})$, $\forall x \text{ Penguin}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Bird}(x)$ Tweety is **Penguin**, Penguins are Birds
2. $\text{Bird}(\text{Tweety})$ From 1
3. $\text{Fly}(\text{Tweety})$, Applying first default rule (consistent so far)

Can't apply 2nd default rule, since it's no longer consistent that Tweety doesn't fly. No more conclusions possible; a maximal consistent set

So yes! Tweety flies.

Default Logic

- **KB** = { **Penguin**(Tweety), $\forall x$ Penguin(x) \Rightarrow Bird(x);
Bird(x) : Fly(x) \Rightarrow Fly(x), Penguin(x) : \neg Fly(x) \Rightarrow \neg Fly(x) }
- But now try applying rules in a different order!

1. Penguin(Tweety), $\forall x$ Penguin(x) \Rightarrow Bird(x) Tweety is **Penguin**, Penguins are Birds
2. Bird(Tweety) From 1
3. \neg Fly(Tweety), 1a + 2nd default rule (consistent so far)

Can't apply first default rule, since it's no longer consistent that Tweety flies. No more conclusions possible; a maximal consistent set
So Tweety doesn't fly!

Default Logic

- Can derive “*Tweety flies*” or “*Tweety doesn’t fly*”
- The maximal consistent Conclusions *differ* in these two cases.
- Similar to the Canadian Robert example for **Circumscription**.
(In fact, circumscription + default logic give *same result* on this example)
- **Common sense**: use *more specific* default first
(i.e., use **Penguin(x) : \neg Fly(x) \Rightarrow \neg Fly(x)** first and derive Tweety flies)

Methods exist for prioritizing defaults