Analyzing DoS-Resistance of Protocols Using a Cost-Based Framework

Vijay Ramachandran

Abstract

This paper addresses protocol susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks. We analyze protocol fragments using Meadows's cost-based framework to identify sequences of actions that render servers disabled, either due to memory or CPU exhaustion. In particular, we show that the JFK protocol is DoS-resistant when bogus messages are handled in an appropriate way. We also discuss the relationship between the protocol properties fail-stop and non-interference and DoS-susceptibility.

Current Citation

V. Ramachandran. "Analyzing DoS-Resistance of Protocols Using a Cost-Based Framework." Yale Univ. Tech. Rep't YALEU/DCS/TR-1239, July 2002.
 

@techreport{tr1239,
	title = {Analyzing {DoS}-Resistance of Protocols Using a Cost-Based Framework},
	author = {Vijay Ramachandran},
	institution = {Yale University},
	month = {July},
	year = {2002},
	number = {YALEU/DCS/TR-1239} }

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(210KB)	Final version (YALEU/DCS/TR-1239)